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THE LEAVE-IT-TO-CONGRESS TREND IN THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW OF TAX IMMUNITIES
By MARGARET SPAHR t
In the present era of rapidly changing American constitutional law,
the law of tax immunities has undergone a marked modification that
has been almost wholly in the direction of whittling down long ac-
cepted tax exemptions. This extension of taxability is of enormous
practical importance but on the theoretical side it is less astonishing
than is the Court's repeated reliance upon a new technique in reaching
its decisions. The opinions in tax cases still abound in dogmatic
formulas derived from the precedents and still seek to balance the
probable economic consequences of tax liability with those to be an-
ticipated from immunity, but the recent trend---especially in opinions
delivered by the late Chief Justice Stone-is to rest the Court's de-
cision upon the explicit or implicit intention of Congress. Even in
those few recent cases in which the Court perpetuates-or even extends
-a traditional tax immunity, its reasoning tends to leave it open to
Congress to terminate the exemption. It may be said with little exag-
geration that the constitutional law of tax immunity is becoming a
law of immunity or liability at the option of Congress.
Judicial deference to Congress appears even in opinions concerned
with constitutional limitations upon congressional power. An inter-
esting example is to be found in the 1939 case of O'Malley v. Wood-
t A. B., 1914, Smith College; A.M., igig, Ph.D., 1926, LL. B., 1929, Columbia
University. Author of The Suprenw Court on the Incidence and.Effects of Taxation
(1925) ; Readings in Recent Political Philosophy (1935) ; and of articles in profes-
sional and legal periodicals. Associate Professor of Political Science, Hunter College
of the City of New York.
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rough,1 in which the Supreme Court departed from the doctrine of
the precedents 2 and sustained federal income taxation of the salary
of a federal judge appointed subsequent to the enactment of the Reve-
nue Act of 1932. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion stressed the fact
that "Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-dis-
criminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the
income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the pro-
hibition of Article III, § I of the Constitution." 3
Repeated expressions of confidence in Congress appear in the re-
cent opinions sustaining the application of federal taxes to state in-
strumentalities. This practice begins in 1938 with the precedent-
shattering case of Helvering v. Gerhardt,4 in which immunity from
federal income taxes was denied to salaries paid by the Port of New
York Authority, and in which the then Associate Justice Stone deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. After referring to the leading case of
McCulloch v. Maryland,5 Mr. Justice Stone pointed out that: "In sus-
taining the immunity from state taxation, the opinion of the Court, by
Chief Justice Marshall, recognized a clear distinction between the ex-
tent of the power of a state to tax national banks and that of the
national government to tax state instrumentalities. He was careful to
point out not only that the taxing power of the national government is
supreme, by reason of the constitutional grant, but that in laying a
federal tax on state instrumentalities the people of the states, acting
through their representatives, are laying a tax on their own institutions
and consequently are subject to political restraints which can be counted
I. 307 U. S. 277 (1939). Mr. Justice Butler wrote a vigorous dissent, while Mr.
Justice McReynolds took no part in the decision.
2. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (i92o) ; Miles v. Graham, 268 U. S. 5oi (1925).
3. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 3o7 U. S. 277, 281, 282 (1939), cited mpra note x.
The full paragraph reads:
"Having regard to these circumstances, the question immediately before us is
whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United
States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity
from the incidences of taxation to which every one else within the defined classes
of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the
position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when
applied to the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the pro-
hibition of Article III,. § i of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads
upon the independence of judges who took office after Congress had thus charged
them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot
share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic
experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, § i [with a
footnote citing the English Act of Settlement and other references on the English
judiciary]. To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges
are also citizens, and that their' particular function in government does not gen-
erate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of
the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering."
4. 304 U. S. 405 (1938). Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented in a brief
opinion by the former.
5. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i819).
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on to prevent abuse." 6 The same sentiment was recently voiced anew
in New York v. United States,7 in which the Court sustained the col-
lection of a federal soft drinks tax upon the sale by New York State
of mineral waters taken from Saratoga Springs. Delivering the lead-
ing 8 opinion in the case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked: "After all,
the representatives of all the States, having, as the appearance of the
Attorneys General of forty-six States at the bar of this Court shows,
common interests, alone can pass such a taxing measure and they alone
in their wisdom can grant or withhold immunity from federal taxa-
*tion of such State activities." 9 Even more far-reaching is another
expression in the same opinion: "Indeed the claim of implied im-
munity by States from federal taxation raises questions not wholly un-
like provisions of the Constitution, such as that of Article IV, § 4,
guaranteeing States a republican form of government, which this Court
has deemed not within its duty to adjudicate." 10
On the related issue of the liability of federal instrumentalities to
state taxation, there is a well-established rule that the judiciary will
carry out the instructions of Congress whenever that body has either
expressly granted or expressly denied tax immunity. In the words of
Mr. Justice Stone in the Port of New York Authority case: "Since
the acts of Congress within its constitutional power are supreme, the
validity of state taxation of federal instrumentalities must depend (a)
on the power of Congress to create the instrumentality and (b) its
intent to protect it from state taxation. Congress may curtail an im-
munity which might otherwise be implied, or enlarge it beyond the
point where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits." 11
No such curtailment or enlargement has ever been invalidated by
judicial decision.
But what if Congress is silent? When a state income tax was
sustained in 1939 with respect to the salaries of employees of the Home
6. H elvering v. Gerhardt, 3o4 U. S. 405, 412 (i938), cited supra note 4.
7. 326 U. S. 572 (1946).
8. There was no "opinion of the Court" in this case, but "Mr. Justice Frankfurter
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice
Rutledge joined." Chief Justice Stone concurred in an opinion in which he was joined
by Justices Reed, Murphy and Burton; Mr. Justice Douglas delivered a dissenting
opinion in which Mr. Justice Black concurred; and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part
in the decision. The case of South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (io5)
figured conspicuously in all opinions.
9. New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 582, 583 (1946), cited supra note 8.
io. Id. at 582. Mr. Justice Frankfurter cited Pacific States Tel. & T. Co. v. Ore-
gon, 223 U. S. 118 (i912), in which the Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction
in a case raising the issue whether the adoption of the initiative and referendum had
deprived Oregon of its republican form of government.
ii. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 4H1, n. I (1938), cited supra notes 4
and 6. The citations in this note are here omitted.
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Owners' Loan Corporation,12 the opinion of the Court, as delivered
by Mr. Justice Stone, observed: "Silence of Congress implies im-
munity no more than does the silence of the Constitution. It follows
that when exemption from state taxation is claimed on the ground
that the federal government is burdened by the tax, and Congress has
disclosed no intention with respect to the claimed immunity, it is in
order to consider the nature and effect of the alleged burden, and if
it appears that there is no ground for implying a constitutional im-
munity, there is equally a want of ground for assuming any purpose
on the part of Congress to create an immunity." '- In this case,
analysis of the tax disclosed no ascertainable resulting burden upon the
federal government, and this was given as a main reason for the
Court's denial of tax immunity; 14 but a couple of years later it was
considered immaterial that the government suffered a very real burden
from certain other state taxes. A contractor constructing an army
camp within Alabama on a cost-plus contract with the United States
had contested his liability for Alabama taxes on his purchases of cer-
tain building materials and his use of others in furtherance of his con-
tract.'5  Again acting as spokesman for the Court, the recently pro-
moted Chief Justice Stone declared that "by concession of the Gov-
ernment and on authority, the Constitution, without implementation
by Congressional legislation, does not prohibit a tax upon Government
contractors because its burden is passed on economically by the terms
of the contract or otherwise as a part of the construction cost to the
Government." 6 This was later confirmed in an important dictum in
the late chief justice's opinion for the Court in Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control Commission of Pennsylvania,17 in which the decision was
12. Graves v. New York ex reL. O'Keefe, 3o6 U. S. 466 (1939). Justices Butler
and McReynolds dissented in an opinion by the former.
13. Id. at 480.
14. Id. at 484-487.
15. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. I (1941) ; Curry v. United States, 314
U. S. 14 (1941). There was no dissent in either case.
16. Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14, 18 (1941), cited supra note 15.
17. "The trend of our decisions is not to extend governmental immunity from state
taxation and regulation beyond the national government itself and governmental func-
tions performed by its officers and agents. We have recognized that the Constitution
presupposes the continued existence of the states functioning in coordination with the
national government, with authority in the states to lay taxes and to regulate their
internal affairs and policy, and that state regulation like state taxation inevitably im-
poses some burdens on the national government of the same kind as those imposed on
citizens of the United States within the state's borders. And we have held that those
burdens, save as Congress may act to remove them, are to be regarded as the normal
incidents of the operation within the same territory of a dual system of government,
and that no immunity of the national government from such burdens is to be implied
from the Constitution which established the system." 318 U. S. 261, 270, 271 (943).
Only three other justices joined the chief justice in this opinion. Mr. Justice Murphy
wrote a concurring opinion; Justices Douglas, Black and Jackson dissented, and Mr.
Justice Rutledge took no part in the decision.
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that minimum price regulations under a state milk control law were
applicable to milk bought by the United States for consumption in an
army camp. A few months later, however, the Court proved that it
does not necessarily regard the silence of Congress as assent to the
imposition of taxation or regulation by the states. In Mayo v. United
States,i8 a Florida statute requiring the inspection of commercial fer-
tilizers and the collection of inspection fees was held constitutionally
inapplicable to fertilizer distributed within Florida under the direction
of the United States Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the
provisions of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.19
Speaking for a substantially 20 unanimous court, Mr. Justice Reed
pointed out: "These inspection fees are laid directly upon the United
States. They are money exactions the payment of which, if they are
enforceable, would be required before executing a function of govern-
ment. . Such a requirement is prohibited by the supremacy clause." 21
He had previously observed: "It lies within the Congressional power
to authorize regulation, including taxation, by the state of federal in-
strumentalities. No such permission is granted here." 22 Finally as
a concluding formula: "The silence of Congress as to the subjection of
its instrumentalities other than the United States to local taxation or
regulation is to be interpreted in the setting of the applicable legis-
lation and the particular exaction. But where, as here, the govern-
mental action is carried on by the United States itself and Congress
does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject
to regulation or taxation, the inherent freedom continues." 23
It may be forcefully objected to this formula that it results in
subjecting certain business transactions affecting -army camps to taxa-
tion and regulation by those favored states in which the camps happen
to be located,24 whereas it immunizes the distribution of fertilizer under
a soil conservation policy applying to all states as uniformly as dif-
ferences in their agricultural products permit. The contrast is the
more striking when it is remembered that army camps are established
under the exclusive power of Congress to raise and support armies,
whereas the soil conservation law is merely a manifestation of the
power of Congress to spend money towards an end that the national
18. 319 U. S. 441 (1943).
i9. 49 STAT. 163 (1935) et seq., I6 U. S. C. § 59o a (1941) et seq.
20. There was no dissent, but Mr. Justice Black merely concurred in the result
21. Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 447 (1943), cited supra note i8.
22. Id. at 446.
23. Id. at 447, 448.
24. The advantageous position of these states in such matters is not unlike that
formerly enjoyed by seaboard states with reference to import duties. On the possibility
of importation directly into an inland state at the present day, see the discussion of
Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, infra pp. 12-15.
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government lacks power to attain by regulation. 25  It might easily
have been held that state regulations under the police power are su-
perior to federal activities in a field immune from federal legislation,
but here is the Supreme Court covering even the power of the purse
with the mantle of federal supremacy. Given such an interpretation,
there is much to say for the position of the old conservative majority
in Butler v. United States,26 which maintained that Congress lacks
power to spend money in order to induce behavior in a field left by the
Constitution to control by the states. On the other hand, once grant-
ing the constitutionality of the Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act, the very preEminence of the states in agricultural matters fur-
nishes a motive for the recognition of immunity by a Court bent on
leaving questions of tax liability to determination by Congress.
Whereas it would be the simplest of propositions to sustain con-
gressional legislation terminating the tax liability recognized by the
Court in the army camp cases, it is difficult to devise any theory on
which fertilizer distributed under the federal spending power could be
exempted by Congress from state taxation if the Court had once held
that inspection fees might be imposed by a state in the silence of
Congress.
25. It is not unworthy of note that the section of the federal act immediately in-
voked is a temporary provision anticipating the early relinquishment of control to the
states. "In order to carry out the purposes specified in § 59o g (a) of this title during the
period necessary to afford a reasonable opportunity for legislative action by a sufficient
number of States to assure the effectuation of such purposes by State action and in
order to promote the more effective accomplishment of such purposes by State action
thereafter, the Secretary shall exercise the powers conferred in this section during the
period prior to Jannay 1, 1947, except with respect to farming operations commenced
in any State after the effective date of a State plan for such State approved pursuant
to § 59o g of this title. No such powers shall be exercised after December 3!, 1946,
except with respect to payments or grants in connection with farming operations car-
ried out prior to January 1, 1947." 55 STAT. 86o (1941), 16 U. S. C. § 59o h (a), as
amended in 1941. The amendment substituted "1947" for "1942' and "1946" for "I941.
26. 297 U. S. 1 (1936). Of particular interest are the following excerpts from
Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion for the majority: "An appropriation to be expended by the
United States under contracts calling for violation of a state law clearly would offend
the Constitution. Is a statute less objectionable which authorizes expenditure of fed-
eral moneys to induce action in a field in which the United States has no power to
intermeddle? The Congress cannot invade state jurisdiction to compel individual
action; no more can it purchase such action. But it is said that there is a wide differ-
Once in another respect, between compulsory regulation of the local affairs of a state's
citizens and the mere making of a contract relating to their conduct; that, if any state
objects, it may declare the contract void and thus prevent those under the state's juris-
diction from complying with its terms. The argument is plainly fallacious. The
United States can make the contract only if the federal power to tax and to appro-
priate reaches the subject-matter of the contract. If this does reach the subject-matter,
its exertion cannot be displaced by state action. To say otherwise is to deny the
supremacy of the laws of the United States; to make them subordinate to those of a
state. This would reverse the cardinal principle embodied in the Constitution and sub-
stitute one which declares that Congress may only effectively legislate as to matters
within federal competence when the states do not dissent" Id. at 72, 73, 74. Mr.
Justice Roberts, who joined in the majority opinion, and Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote
the dissent in Butler v. United States, were the only justices who participated in both
that case and the Mayo case.
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Without lingering longer over the decisions on intergovernmental
taxes-recently exhaustively examined by Professor Thomas Reed
Powell in articles in the Harvard Law Review 2 7-the purpose of this
article is to fit the Court's recent position on import taxation into the
pattern developed in the intergovernmental tax cases. It is obvious
that state taxes affecting imports must be ostensibly examined under
the express provision that "No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection laws; and
the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Im-
ports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul
of the Congress." 28 Nevertheless it is the writer's theory that the
Court's use of the import clause in recent years has far less in common
with the line of import clause precedents than it has with the leave-it-
to-Congress trend observed in the cases on intergovernmental taxation.
Only a very few recent Supreme Court decisions have hinged
upon the language of the import clause. Indeed, throughout the entire
history of the Court, this clause has proved far less useful than the
commerce clause in averting state taxes aimed at goods introduced
from without.29 The vast majority of goods of extra-state origin were
deprived of the protection of the import clause when it was decided in
1868 that this constitutional prohibition has no application to interstate
commerce, 30 and goods from abroad were held in the same term of
court to have lost their character as imports upon sale by the
importer.31 Although one of these holdings was in conflict, and one
in accord, with suggestions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the lead-
ing case,32 the two 1868 decisions were at one in narrowing the'defini-
tion of imports. A few'years later the commerce clause was used to
27. Powell, The Waning of Intergovernnental Tax Immunities (1945) 58 HARv.
L. Rxv. 633, and The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, id. at 757.
28. U. S. CoxsT.: Art. I, § Io, Par. 2.
29. On the use of these clauses see Spahr, The Supreme Court on the Incidence
and Effects of Taxation (1925) X, SMITH COLLEGE STUDIES IN HISTORY, Nos. 2,
3, 4, chapters II and III. Except as a few modifications are indicated in the present
article, the writer adheres to the views she expressed twenty years ago.
30. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868). Mr. Justice Nelson, the only
survivor of the Court that had sat in the License Cases, uttered a vigorous dissent.
31. Waring v. Mayor of Mobile, 8 W41. io (U. S. 1868).
32. "It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case,
to apply equally to importations from a sister state." Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419, 449 (U. S. 1827). "It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the
importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of state; but while
remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or pack-
age in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape
the prohibition in the constitution!' Id. at 44I, 442. This second quotation constitutes
the well-known original package formula.
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invalidate a state law which forbade peddling without a license but
which exempted those peddlers who sold nothing but the growth, pro-
duce or manufacture of the taxing state.33 From this it followed that
the commerce clause became available, as a supplement or as an alterna-
tive to the import clause, whenever state taxes should discriminate
against foreign commerce.34 In 1878, in deciding the case of Cook v.
Pennsylvania,35 the Supreme Court invoked both the import clause and
the commerce clause against a state tax on auctioneers measured by
their gross receipts from auction sales of goods of foreign origin,
while auction sales of domestic articles were left untaxed. The main
emphasis was upon the import clause in this decision, 36 but sixty years
later, under somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of
our own day preferred a different technique. Exorbitant state "in-
spection fees" upon cement imported from abroad, where there was no
corresponding inspection of domestic cement, were contested in 1939 in
the case of Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc.; ', the "fees" were first exam-
ined under the commerce clause and were found so clearly objectionable
that the Court did not even take up the question raised under the im-
port clause.
38
Another tax recently invalidated under the commerce clause, al-
though objections had been urged under the import clause as well, met
its doom because of the actual exercise by Congress of its power to
regulate foreign commerce. The respondent corporation in McGold-
rick v. Gulf Oil Corporation 39 had imported crude petroleum into New
York City under bond, manufactured it into fuel oil in a bonded ware-
house, and delivered it alongside the foreign-bound vessels to which
the oil had been sold as fuel. The federal law provided for a drawback,
33. "It is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power continues until the
commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its
foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from
any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin." Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S.
275, 282 (1875).
34. "The Congress of the United States is granted the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations in precisely the same language as it is that among the States. If
a tax assessed by a State injuriously discriminating against the products of a State of
the Union is forbidden by the Constitutition, a similar tax against goods imported from
a foreign State is equally forbidden." Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 573 (878),
cited infra note 35.
35. 97 U. S. 566 (1878).
36. "The tax on sales made by an auctioneer is a tax on the goods sold, . .
and when applied to foreign goods sold in the original packages of the importer, before
they have become incorporated into the general property of the country, the law im-
posing such tax is void as laying a duty on imports." Id. at 573.
37. 3o6 U. S. 375 (1939).
38. "But it would not be easy to imagine a statute more clearly designed than the
present to circumvent what the Commerce Clause forbids. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97
U. S. 566; Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62. This makes it unnecessary to consider the
objections urged under Article I, § 10, cl. 2." Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 3o6 U. S.
375, 380, 381 (I939), cited supra note 37.
39. 309 U. S. 414 (1940).
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under such circumstances, of the usual tariff duties on imported crude
petroleum, but the city of New York attempted to collect its sales tax
upon the fuel oil sold and delivered within its limits. Without any
dissent,40 the Supreme Court found that the sales tax "must fail as an
infringement of the Congressional regulation of the commerce," and that
no other objections need be considered.4 1 It should be noted, however,
that Mr. Justice Stone's opinion contained a dictum on the subject of
imports 42 which enabled him later, in a case concerned wholly with the
import clause, to cite McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corporation as an author-
ity on that provision.
4 3
A few years before the Gulf Oil Corporation decision, the case of
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. Alabama 44 had involved
the import clause so obliquely that the Supreme Court divided six to
three as to whether the issue of state taxation of imports had even
been raised. The appellant was a New York corporation which had
qualified to do business in Alabama and had been subjected to a
franchise tax measured by its capital employed in that state. For the
tax year in question, the only capital employed by the corporation
within Alabama had been several million bags of nitrate of soda which
had been imported from Chile, stored in a public warehouse in Mobile,
and sold-upon orders-to customers, to whom the nitrate was
eventually shipped in the same hundred-pound bags in which it had
been originally imported. On these facts, the majority of the Court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Butler, determined that the Alabama tax on
foreign corporations was laid upon the actual doing of business within
the state, that the only business done within Alabama in this instance
was the selling of imports in the original packages, and that therefore
the franchise tax was void as a tax on imports levied by a state "with-
40. It is improbable that any significance is to be attached to the fact that Mr.
Justice McReynolds took no part in the decision of the case.
41. "The Congressional regulation, read in the light of its purpose, is tantamount
to a declaration that in order to accomplish constitutionally permissible ends, the im-
ported merchandise shall not become a part of the common mass of taxable property
within the state, pending its disposition as ships' stores and shall not become subject
to the state taxing power. . . . The state tax in the circumstances must fail as an
infringement of the Congressional regulation of the commerce. . . . It is unnecessary
to consider whether the tax upon the sale of the oils as ships' stores to vessels engaged in
foreign commerce is in the circumstances of this case an impost on imports or exports,
or a duty of tonnage prohibited by Article I, § 1o, Clauses 2 and 3 of the Constitution."
Id. at 429.
42. "For present purposes we may assume, without deciding, that had the crude
oil not been imported in bond it would, upon its manufacture, have become a part of
the common mass of property in the state and so would have lost its distinctive char-
acter as an import and its constitutional immunity as such from state taxation' Id.
at 423.
43. Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 666 (945).
44. 288 U. S. 218 (1933).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
out the consent of Congress." 45 In opposition to this, Justices
Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone reasoned, in an opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Cardozo, that the Alabama tax was laid upon the privilege
of doing business in a corporate capacity rather than upon the business
done, that -Alabama might legitimately use the capital employed within
the state as the measure of a tax upon a foreign corporation, and that
"it was a mere fortuity that in this instance the capital was made up
of imports still intact." 41 In developing their argument, the dissenters
showed that the discriminatory taxes invalidated in certain earlier
cases had subjected imported articles to a burden considered and in-
tended, whereas the presence of imported packages in the instant case
was an adventitious circumstance. 4 7  No reference was made in the
dissent to the majority's remarks concerning the consent of Congress
to state taxation.
In comparison with the case just examined, that of Gulf Fisheries
Co. v. Mac Inerney 48 is almost absurdly simple. A-Texas license tax
upon wholesale dealers in fish was contested by a company that did its
entire business on a wharf in Galveston. On this wharf, fish that had
been caught in the Gulf of Mexico were landed in bulk, weighed,
washed, re-iced, gutted (except for a small percentage of the catch), and
either loaded on express cars or sold to local wholesale dealers. The
company contended that a tax on a business so conducted was a tax
upon imports, but the Supreme Court held unanimously that "the tax is
not laid until the fish have lost thei alleged distinctive character as
imports and have become through processing, handling and sale, a
part of the mass of property subject to taxation by the state." 41 Mr.
45. "The stipulation of the parties shows that the only transactions in Alabama in
which appellant is concerned are the landing, storage, and sale of the nitrate in the
form and packages in which it was put up abroad and transported into the United
States. The bags were kept intact, no nitrate was removed therefrom, and prior to the
delivery of the same to those who bought from appellant, it was not in any manner
commingled with, and did not become a part of, the general mass of property within
the state. The right to import the nitrate included the right to sell it in the original
bags while it remained the property of appellant and before it lost its distinctive char-
acter as an import. State prohibition of such sales would take from appellant the very
rights in respect of importation that are conferred by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Alabama was powerless, without the consent of Congress, to tax the
nitrate before such sales or to require appellant by the payment of occupation or
franchise tax or otherwise to purchase from it the privilege of selling goods so im-
ported and handled. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 436, 442-444"' Id. at 225, 226.
46. Id. at 235.
47. "Brown v. Maryland was a case of a discriminatory tax upon the business of
importers, and Cook v. Pennsylvania a case of a discriminatory tax upon an auctioneer
selling for importers. In neither was there a franchise, or a tax upon a franchise, or
reference to capital as a standard of measurement. In each the presence of imported
packages to be subjected to a burden was an event considered and intended, not an
adventitious circumstance developing unexpectedly in the application of the tax to one
taxpayer out of many." Id. at 238.
48. 276 U. S. 124 (1928).,
49. Id. at 127. Note also: "The tax is laid, not according to the weight of the fish
when landed, but upon the fish sold. All that is sold has been handled as above stated.
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Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court distinguished several earlier
cases in which state taxes had been invalidated, but neglected all
reference to the decision reached in 19oo in May v. New Orleans.50
The authority of the May case might, however, have been effectively
used to support the Court's position in the Gulf Fisheries Company
case, for in both instances alleged "imports" were denied immunity
from non-discriminatory state taxation on the ground that the goods
had been so acted upon as to be incorporated into the common mass
of property in the state.51 In the New Orleans case, the taxes were
general property taxes and the goods assessed were imported dry
goods in the same packages in which they had been originally placed
by the foreign manufacturers and in which they were subsequently
sold by sample. The manufacturers' packages had, however, been
shipped to this country within wooden boxes and the Supreme Court
held, by a bare majority,52 that the opening of the wooden cases incor-
porated the parcels into the mass of property within Louisiana and
subjected them to taxation as property along with other property in
the state.53 Mr. Justice Harlan's rather rambling opinion devoted
disproportionate space to a description of the packing and shipping
practices used in the importer's business, but included a fairly effective
differentiation of property taxes from taxes that singled out imports,5 4
None of it has remained in its original condition. None is in an original package, and
little in its original form. This is obvously true of the 75 per -cent. which is beheaded
and gutted and of the 7 to io per cent. more which is gutted and gilled with the heads
on. But the small remainder is, when sold, no longer in its original condition. Before
sale, it is washed and re-iced. It is taken from the bulk and put loose with ice in bar-
rels. And all this has been done on the wharf. These facts make inapplicable cases
like Brouwn v. Maryland; Low v. Austin.; Cook v. Pennsylvania."
50. 178 U. S. 496 (igoo).
51. "All the fish sold have, after landing and before laying the tax, been so acted
upon as to become part of the common property of the State. They have lost their
distinctive character as imports and have become taxable by the state." Gulf Fisheries
Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U. S. 124, 127 (1928). cited supra note 48. "So the question
in the present case is whether the plaintiffs, prior to the assessment complained of, had
so acted upon the goods imported by them as to incorporate them with the mass of the
property in the state, and bring them, while in their possession, within the range of
local taxation. . . . In our judgment, the 'original package' in the present case was
the box or case in which the goods imported were shipped, and when the box or case
was opened for the sale or delivery of the separate parcels contained in it, each parcel
of the goods lost its distinctive character as an import and became property subject to
taxation by the State as other like property situated within its limits." May v. New
Orleans, 178 U, S. 496, 5o8, 509 (igoo), cited supra note 5o.
52. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer, Shiras and Pecklam dissented with-
out opinion.
53. May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496, 508, 509 (i9oo). See note 51 supra for
quotation.
54. "The tax here in question was not in any sense a tax on imports nor a tax for
the privilege of bringing the things imported into the State. It was not a tax on the
plaintiffs' goods because they were imported from another country, but because at the
time of the assessment they were in the market for sale in separate parcels, and there-
fore subject to be taxed as like property, in the same condition, that had its origin in
this country. . . . A different view is not justified by anything said in Brown v.
Maryland. It was there held that the importer by paying duties acquired the right to
sell in the original packages the goods imported,-the Maryland statute requiring a
license fron; the State before any one could sell 'by wholesale, bale or package, hogs-
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aid pointed out the unfortunate economic consequences that would
result from tax immunity under the circumstances of the particular
case.55
The case most recently decided under the import clause, Hooven
and Allison Co. v. Evatt,56 differs from other recent cases but re-
sembles May v. New Orleans-and one earlier case -- in that it in-
volved the validity of general property taxes. The appellant was a
cordage manufacturing concern, and the property assessed by Ohio con-
sisted of bales of fibers stored in the warehouse of the company's fac-
tory at Xenia in the original packages in which they had been im-
ported into the United States. Some of the bales had been shipped
from foreign countries and others from the Philippine Islands, but all
alike were intended for eventual use as raw material in the company's
factory. The Ohio courts had held that the foreign sellers or their
agents were the importers, and that the fibers had therefore lost their
immunity as imports by reason of sale to the cordage company. In
the United States Supreme Court, however, there was apparently' no
dissent from Chief Justice Stone's opinion that the instant case differed
from that on which the Ohio courts relied 58 in that the cordage com-
pany's contracts of purchase were the inducing and efficient cause of
the importation,5" and in that the risk of loss from change of market
value was on the company, 6 -- not on the seller or on the broker or
banker who served as consignee. Although the imported goods were
regularly entered at New York City and trans-shipped to Xenia, the
intricate business practices of the present day had enabled the Ohio
head, barrel or tierce,' goods imported from other countries. But it was not held that
the right to sell was attended with an immunity from all taxation upon the goods as
property, after-they had ceased to be imports and had become by the act of the im-
porter a part of the general mass of property in the state. The contrary was adjudged.
[Italics in original.]" Id. at 509.
55. In particular: "It cannot be overlooked that the interpretation of the Consti-
tution for which plaintiffs contend would encourage American merchants and traders,
seeking to avoid state and local taxation, to import from abroad all the merchandise
and commodities which they would need in their business." Id. at 503. Also: "In-
deed, under plaintiffs' view, the Constitution secures to the manufacturer of foreign
goods imported into this country an immunity from taxation that is denied to manu-
facturers of domestic goods. An interpretation attended with such consequences ought
not to be adopted if it can be avoided without doing violence to the words of the Con-
stitution." Id. at 504.
56. 324 U. S. 652 (1945), cited .rupra note 43. For an exceedingly interesting dis-
cussion of the opinions in this case, see Powell, State Taxation of Imports (1945) 58
HAxv. L. REv. 858.
57. Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (U. S. 1871). This case, which is reviewed later
in this article, infra pp. 22-24, seems to have been overlooked by both counsel and
Court in May v. New Orleans.
58. Waring v. Mayor of Mobile, 8 Wall. 1lO (U. S. 1868). For the position 6f
the United States Supreme Court towards this case, see particularly Hooven and Alli-
son Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 663, n. 4 (945), cited supra notes 43 and 56.
59. "Petitioner's contracts of purchase are the inducing and efficient cause of
bringing the merchandise into the country, which is importation." Id at 66I.
6o. "The risk of loss from change of market value was on petitioner, save as it
might insure against such loss at its own expense." Id. at 662.
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manufacturer to become an importer. The decision of the Supreme
Court on this point has much to commend it over a contrary holding
based upon technical questions of passing of title, but it is odd that an
opinion concerned with Ohio taxation of a Xenia importer should
praise the import clause as a protection to the interior states from
unequal taxation by states on the seaboard.61
The cordage company having thus been declared to be the im-
porter, the question to be determined was whether the imported fibers
retained their tax immunity while stored for use in manufacture. The
chief justice answered in the affirmative, but carried with him only
four of his associates, Justices Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson.
Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge gave a negative answer
in an emphatic opinion by Mr. Justice Black. In striking contrast
with the iconoclasm evidenced by the "New Deal Court" toward cer-
tain other dogmas of constitutional law, both the majority and the
dissenting opinion in this import clause case treated Chief Justice
Marshall's original package formula 62 as though it were an inspired
text.63 The chief justice rephrased the classic rule in terms of the
purpose of the importation, thus bringing imports for manufacture into
the same class as imports for sale 64; Mr. Justice Black undertook to
prove that the formula, taken in its context, establishes the immunity
of imports only while they are still en route to their ultimate pur-
chaser,"5 wherefore goods awaiting use in manufacture are liable to
6i. "It is obvious that if the states were left free to tax things imported after they
are introduced into the country and before they are devoted to the use for which they
are imported, the purpose of the constitutional prohibition would be defeated. The
fears of the framers, that importation could be subjected to the burden of unequal local
taxation by the seaboard, at the expense of the interior states, would be realized, as
effectively as though the states had been authorized to lay import duties." Id. at 656.
62. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 449 (U. S. 1827). The formula is quoted
supra; note 32 and also infra pp. 15-17.
63. Note, for example, the following passage from Chief Justice Stone's opinion:
"On the other hand the immunity is adequately protected and the state power to tax
is adequately safeguarded if, as has been the case since Brozop v. Maryland, an import
is deemed to retain its character as such 'while remaining the property of the im-
porter, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported'
or until put to the use for which it was imported." Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt,
324 U. S. 652, 665 (1945), cited supra notes 43, 56 and 58. Also, from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Black: "In Brown v. Maryland, Marshall, C. J., pointedly rejected the argu-
ment that the rule announced in that case would permit an importer to 'bring in goods
• . . for his own use, and thus retain much valuable property exempt from taxa-
tion.' Today, this Court, in holding that an Ohio manufacturer may escape payment
of a non-discriminatory state ad valorem tax on goods imported from abroad and held
for use in its factory, interprets Marshall's opinion in a manner which squarely con-
flicts with his own interpretation of the rule he announced." Id. at 686, 687.
64. "Unless we are to ignore the constitutional prohibition we cannot say that im-
ports for manufacture are not entitled to the immunity which the Constitution com-
mands, and we see no theoretical or practical grounds for saying, more than in the
case of goods imported for sale, that the immunity ends while they are in the original
package and before they are devoted to the purpose for which they were imported." Id.
at 668.
65. "The Court, in Broz v. Maryland, was in reality treating goods in the hands
of an importer for sale, as though they were still in transit until the first sale had
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taxation.6 6  Each justice cited Chief Justice Taney as an authority on
Chief Justice Marshall's meaning,67 but neither showed any awareness
of the fact that Chief Justice Taney had expressly conceded the validity
of property taxes on imported goods held by a resident importing
merchant for sale 68 and had at least hinted that Chief Justice Marshall
had held the same opinion on this point."9
The final constitutional issue in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt
concerned the propriety of regarding fibers brought into the conti-
nental United States from the Philippine Islands as imports in the
constitutional sense of the term. Starting with Chief Justice Marshall's
definition of imports as "articles brought into a country" 70 and relying
on the admitted power of Congress to lay tariff duties upon goods
brought from the Philippines, 71 Chief Justice Stone argued that a
foreign origin is not indispensable and that fibers brought from the
Philippines are imports on exactly the same terms as fibers from for-
eign countries. 72  Justices Douglas and Murphy, although dissenters
been made. This was in accord with the interpretation of the rule by Chief Justice
Taney in the License Cases. He there said that while imported articles 'are in the
hands of the importer for sale . . . they may be regarded as merely in transitu,
and on their way to the distant cities, villages and country for which they are destined,
and where they are expected to be used and consumed, and for the supply of which
they were in truth imported." Id. at 688.
66. "But the fibers here were not in transitu in any possible sense of the phrase.
Every conceivable relationship they had once borne to the process of importation had
ended. They were at rest in the petitioner's factory along with its other raw materials,
having arrived at the point where they were 'to be used and consumed' in current
production, and kept as a 'backlog' to assure constant operation of the plant." Id. at
688, 689.
67. For Mr. Justice Black's reference to the views of. Chief Justice Taney see
note 65 supra. Chief Justice Stone's reference is: "But no opinion of this Court has
ever said or intimated that imports held by the importer in the original package and
before they were subjected to the manufacture for which they were imported, are liable
to state taxation. On the contrary, Chief Justice Taney, in affirming the doctrine of
Brown v. Maryland, in which he appeared as counsel for the State, declared, as we
now affirm: 'Indeed, goods imported, while they remain in the hands of the importer,
in the form and shape in which they were brought into the country, can in no just
sense be regarded as a part of that mass of property in the State usually taxed for the
support of the State government."' Id. at 666.
68. "Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon its citizens in proportion to the
amount they are respectively worth; and the importing merchant is liable to this
assessment like any other citizen, and is chargeable according to the amount of his
property, whether it consists of money engaged in trade, or of imported goods which
he proposes to sell, or any other property of which he is the owner." License Cases,
5 How. 504, 576 (U. S. 1847).
69. This point is developed infra pp. i8-ig.
70. "The Constitution provides us with no definition of the term 'imports' other
than such as is implicit in the word itself. Imports were defined by Chief Justice
Marshall in Brown v. Maryland at 437 as 'things imported' and 'articles brought into
a country.' He added: 'If we appeal to usage for the meaning of the word, we shall
receive the same answer. They are the articles themselves which are brought into the
country.'" 324 U. S. 652, 669 (I945), cited supra notes 43, 56, 58 and 63.
71. Id. at 672-674, 678.
72. "We conclude that practical as well as theoretical considerations and the struc-
ture of our constitutional system require us to hold that articles brought from the
Philippines into the United States are imports, subject to the constitutional provisions
relating to imports both because, as was said in Brown v. Maryland, they are brought
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as to the immunity of imports held by the importer for use in manu-
facture, concurred in the chief justice's opinion that goods from the
Philippines may be regarded as imports, 73 but Mr. Justice Reed, who
had been of the majority on the former question, uttered a vigorous
dissent from the Court's holding that "the Philippine Islands is not a
part of this 'country'." 74 Mr. Justice Reed preferred to make "country"
coterminous with sovereignty 75 and to define imports as "things
brought into the territory under the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the
American government." 76 Important considerations of policy were
advanced on both sides, but this policy issue is inextricably bound up
with the theory advanced by Chief Justice Stone that it may be left to
Congress to obliterate, should this seem desirable, the import clause
limitations upon the tax power of the states. This leave-it-to-Congress
proposition will be carefully examined in due course, but first it is
fitting to give further consideration to the major premise of all the
several opinions in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt. As already
observed, this premise is the allegedly orthodox proposition that im-
ports in the original package enjoy a special immunity from the tax
power of a state, even when that power is exerted in a non-discrim-
inatory general property tax.
The words original package in American constitutional law are
probably to be traced to an act passed in i8i9 by the Maryland legis-
lature, which required an eight-dollar annual license from every retail
merchant. By way of definition, this statute provided that "every
person who shall deal in the selling of any goods, wares or merchandize,
except such as are of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the
United States, and except such as are sold by the importer thereof in
the original cask, case, box or package, wherein the same shall have
been imported, shall be deemed to be, and hereby is declared to be, a
retail dealer in merchandize within the meaning of this act." 77 Im-
porters selling in the original packages remained untaxed until 1821,
into the United States, and because the place from whence they are brought is not a
part of the United States in the constitutional sense to which the provisions with re-
spect to imports are applicable." Id. at 679.
73. Mr. Justice Douglas merely indicated his concurrence on this point, while
Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a short opinion.
74. "My disagreement with the Court is confined to that portion of the opinion
which determines that the Philippine Islands is not a part of this 'country' as that word
is defined in the opinion." Id. at 679, 68o.
75. "Lands are either within the sovereign power of the United States or are out-
side and beyond that power. When conquest ripens into cession, lands lose their for-
eign character and become a part of the territories of the victor." Id. at 68r, 682.
76. "No light can come from the history of the adoption of the section. The idea
of an American possession was not in being. But since the Founding Fathers were
creating a commercial as well as a political entity, it seems more consonant with their
purpose to define imports under the section as things brought into the territory under
the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the American government." Id. at 685, 686.
77. Laws of Maryland (i8ig) c. 184, § i.
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when Maryland enacted a supplementary statute which provided that
"all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares
or merchandise, by bale or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey
and other distilled spiritous liquors, etc., and other persons selling the
same by.wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrell or tierce, shall,
before they are authorized to sell, take out a license as by the.original
act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars." 78 Thus Mary-
land required no license of dealers all of whose wares were articles
produced within the United States, but classified dealers in foreign
products into the three categories of importers, wholesale dealers, and
retail dealers by reference to the packages in which the imported
articles were offered for sale. In 1827, the case of Brown v. Mary-
land7 9 brought before the Supreme Court the tax laid by Maryland on
an importer, but the only weapon at the Court's disposal was a con-
stitutional text that used the word imports. Thus it came about that
original packages passed from the Maryland statutory definition of
importer into Chief Justice Marshall's classic definition of imports:-
"It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the im-
porter has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incor-
porated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has,
perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has thus be-
come subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining
the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form
or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a
duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution." 80 It
will be observed that whereas the fibers in the Hooven and Allison
case were imports under this language taken literally, the cordage
manufacturers would not have been importers under the Maryland
conception of an importer as a dealer in merchandise in the original
cask, case or package in which it had been imported.
But was it ever intended that the original package formula should
be literally applied to a state tax bearing upon all property alike? The
Maryland license system discriminated against dealers handling foreign
products, much as the tax on banknotes involved in McCulloch v.
Maryland "I discriminated against the banking operations of the Na-
tional Bank. Chief Justice Marshall's language in the McCulloch
case was sweeping enough to condemn any state taxation in any way
relating to the bank, but he added: "This opinion does not deprive
the states of any resources which they originally possessed. It does
78. Laws of Maryland (1821) C. 246, § 2.
79. 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
8o. Id. at 441, 442.
81. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i8ig).
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not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common
with the other real property within the state, nor to a tax imposed on
the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institu-
tion, in common with other property of the same description through-
out the state." -2 It may very well be that the chief justice intended
likewise to limit the effect of his import formula by the caution, "We
do not mean to give any opinion on a tax not discriminating between
foreign and domestic articles." To be sure, the observation is printed
as "We do not mean to give any opinion on' a tax discriminating be-
tween foreign and domestic articles," S3 but this is meaningless in view
of the fact that the very tax invalidated in Brown v. Maryland did
discriminate in this very manner. The writer adheres to her
hypothesis s4 that a negative particle was inadvertently omitted by the
chief justice or the reporter or the printer from a sentence that was
intended to discourage inferences condemning the validity of non-dis-
criminatory taxes.
By the time that the import clause again reached the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Marshall was dead, but the attorney general who
had presented Maryland's case against Brown had become Chief Jus-
tice Taney. Exceptional importance therefore attaches to that portion
of the chief justice's opinion in the License Cases s that deals with the
tax immunity of imports. His views are so frequently misrepresented
by partial quotation that it seems wise to quote his entire review of the
leading import case:
"It is unquestionably no easy task to mark by a certain and
definite line the division between foreign and domestic commerce,
and to fix the precise point, in relation to every imported article,
where the paramount power of Congress terminates, and that of
the State begins. The Constitution itself does not attempt to
define these limits. They cannot be determined by the laws of
Congress or the States, as neither can by its own legislation en-
large its own powers, or restrict those of the other. And as the
Constitution itself does not draw the line, the question is neces-
sarily one for judicial decision and depending altogether upon the
words of the Constitution.
"This question came directly before the court for the first
time in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland. And the
court there held that an article authorized by a law of Congress
to be imported continued to be a part of the foreign commerce of
the country while it remained in the hands of the importer for
sale, in the original bale, package, or vessel in which it was im-
82. Id. at 436.
83. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 449 (U. S. 1827).
84. Spahr, op. cit. sapra note 29 at 146.
85. 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ported; that the authority given to import necessarily carried with
it the right to sell the imported article in the form and shape in
which it was imported, and that no State, either by direct assess-
ment or by requiring a license from the importer before he was
permitted to sell, could impose any burden upon him or the prop-
erty imported beyond what the law of Congress had itself im-
posed; but that when the original package was broken up for use
or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity had
passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased to
be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and became subject
to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for State purposes,
and the sale regulated by the State, like any other property. This
I understand to be substantially the decision in the case of Brown
v. The State of Maryland, drawing the line between foreign com-
merce which is subject to the regulation of Congress, and internal
or domestic commerce, which belongs to the States, and over
which Congress can exercise no control.
"I argued the case in behalf of the State and endeavored to
maintain that the law of Maryland, which required the importer
as well as other dealers to take out a license before he could sell,
and for which he was to pay a certain sum to the State, was valid
and constitutional; and certainly I at that time persuaded myself
that I was right, and thought the decision of the court restricted
the powers of the State more than a sound construction of the
Constitution of the United States would warrant. But further
and more mature reflection has convinced me that the rule laid
down by the Supreme Court is a just and safe one, and perhaps
the best that could have been adopted for preserving the right of
the United States on the one hand and of the States on the other,
and preventing collision between them. The question, I have
already said, was a very difficult one for the judicial mind. In
the nature of things, the line of division is in some degree vague
and indefinite, and I do not see how it could be drawn more ac-
curately and correctly, or more in harmony, with the obvious inten-
tion and object of this provision in the Constitution. Indeed,
goods imported, while.they remain in the hands of the importer,
in the form and shape in which they were brought into the
country, can in no sense be regarded as part of the mass of prop-
erty in the State usually taxed for the support of the State govern-
ment. The immense amount of foreign products used and con-
sumed in this country are imported, landed, and offered for sale
in a few commercial cities, and a very small portion of them are
intended or expected to be used in the State in which they are
imported. A great (perhaps the greater) part imported, in some
of the cities, is not owned or brought in by citizens of the State,
but by citizens of other States, or foreigners. And while they
are in the hands of the importer for sale, in the form and shape in
which they were introduced, and in which they are intended to be
sold, they may be regarded as merely in transitu, and on their way
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to the distant cities, villages and country for which they are
destined, and where they are expected to be used and consumed,
and for the supply of which they were in truth imported. And
a tax upon them while in this condition, for State purposes,
whether by direct assessment, or indirectly, by requiring a license
to sell, would be hardly more justifiable in principle than a transit
duty upon the merchandise when passing through a State. A tax
in any shape upon imports is a tax on the consumer, by enhancing
the price of the commodity. And if a State is permitted to levy
it in any form, it will put it in the power of a maritime importing
State to raise a revenue for the support of its own government
from citizens of other States, as certainly and effectually as if the
tax was laid openly and without disguise as a duty on imports.
Such a power in a State would defeat one of the principal objects
of forming and adopting the Constitution. It cannot be done
directly, in the shape of a duty on imports, for that is expressly
prohibited. And as it cannot be done directly, it could hardly be
a just and sound construction of the Constitution which would
enable a State to accomplish precisely the same thing under another
name, and in a different form.
"'Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon, its citizens in
proportion to the amount they are respectively worth; and the
importing merchant is liable to this assessm'ent like any other
citizen, and is chargeable according to the amount of his property,
whether it consists of money engaged in trade, or of imported
goods which he proposes to sell, or any other property of which he
is the owner. [Italics added.] But a tax of this description stands
upon a very different footing from the tax on the thing imported,
while it remains a part of foreign commerce, and is not introduced
into the general mass of property in the State. Nor, indeed, can
if even influence materially the price of the commodity to the
consumer, since foreigners, as well as citizens of other States,
who are not chargeable with the tax, may import goods into the
same place and offer them for sale in the same market, and with
whom the resident merchant necessarily enters into competition.
"Adopting, therefore, the rule as laid down in Brown v. The
State of Maryland, I proceed to apply it to the cases of Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island." '0
Except for the introduction of italics and the omission of a citation,
these passages stand exactly as they appear in Chief Justice Taney's
printed opinion. There is an undoubted implication that a state may
not lay property taxes upon one who is not a citizen of that state, but
it is crystal clear that the chief justice believed that any one who is
taxable on his property is taxable upon his entire property, including
86. Id. at 574-576.
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imported merchandise held for sale. What is even more significant is
the insertion of the passage on property taxation so as to make it part
and parcel- of "the rule as laid down in Brown v. The State of Mary-
land." Whether or not Chief Justice Marshall actually intended his
remark to read: "We do not mean to give any opinion on a tax not
discriminating between foreign and domestic articles," there seems to
be no doubt about Chief Justice Taney's conception of his predecessor's
views. Clearly the later chief justice had no suspicion that the Supreme
Court had asserted that imports in the original package enjoy exemp-
tion from the regular property taxes imposed by the state of which the
importer is a resident.
Careful study of all the diverse opinions delivered in the License
Cases and of the voluminous reports of the arguments of counsel serves
to confirm this view of the almost contemporaneous understanding of
the doctrine of Brown v. Maryland. The only intimation that the
original package doctrine bars property taxation of imports in the origi-
nal packages was given by Mr. Justice Daniel,8 7 and this particular
justice, far from indorsing such extended tax immunity, flatly repudi-
ated the entire original package doctrine."" As for the argument of
counsel, it should be noted that all attacks made upon the liquor license
measures under consideration were directed against their regulatory
87. "The doctrines which to me appear to have been gratuitously brought into
this case are those which have been promulged in the reasoning of this court in the
case of Brown v. The State of Maryland-doctrines (and I speak it with all due re-
spect) which I conceive cannot, by correct induction, be derived from the constitu-
tion, nor even from the grounds assumed for their foundation in the reasoning of the
court in that case; but which, on the contrary, appear to be wholly illogical and arbi-
trary. The doctrines adverted to are these. That under the operation of that pro-
vision in the constitution which confers on Congress the power of regulating commerce
with foreign nations. etc.. etc.. and by the further provision which prohibits to the
States the power of levying imposts or duties on imports, merchandise, or property
imported from abroad-however completely its transit may have been ended, however
completely it shall have passed beyond all agencies and obligations in reference to the
federal government, and however absolutely, exclusively, and undeniably it shall have
become the property, and passed into the possession, of the citizen resident within the
State, and protected both in person and property by the laws of the State-shall never
become subject to taxation, in common with other property of the same citizen, whilst
it shall remain in the bale, package, or form in which it shall have been imported, nor
until (to use the language of the court) it shall have been 'broken up and mingled
with the general mass of property.'" Id. at 611, 612.
88. "With regard to this phrase, 'broken up and mingled with the mass of prop-
erty', so often appealed to with the view to illustration, it may be worth while to re-
mark, in passing, how often words introduced for the purpose of explanation are
themselves the means of creating doubt or ambiguity! With respect to the phrase
above mentioned, it may be retorted that a person may import a steam engine, a piano,
a telescope, or a horse, and many other subjects, which could not be broken up in order
to be mingled with the general mass of property. If, then, this phrase is to be appre-
hended as signifying (and this alone seems its reasonable meaning) the appropriation
of a subject imported in absolute private right and enjoyment, either positively or
relatively, it surrenders the whole matter in dispute, and admits that all the property
of the citizen, who is himself protected in his person and in the enjoyment of his prop-
erty, is bound to contribute to the support of the government which yields this protec-
tion, whether he shall have imported that property, or purchased it at home." Id. at
612, 613.
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and prohibitory aspects.8 9  The counsel for the appellant in the Rhode
Island case emphasized his point by contrasting the power to tax with
that to prohibit. As to the former: "The taxing power is a sovereign
power, necessary for the support of government, and never in its na-
ture or effect' treated as a repugnant power. When exerted by the
State over personal property in general, including imports, it cannot
affect foreign commerce, or the revenues of the United States, since it
bears equally upon all articles, and thus keeps their relative value the
same. To become mischievous, either constitutionally or practically, to
foreign commerce, a tax law must discriminate as to the subjects of
it." 10 It seems reasonably certain that in 1847, twenty years after the
first pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the import clause, the
constitutional tradition as to the immunity of imports in the original
packages did not include acceptance of the invalidity of state property
taxes as applied to such imported goods.
But it is not surprising that the various dicta of the License Cases
made less impression upon legal thought than did the phrases of Chief
Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland. In 1872, when the case of
Low v. Austin 91 squarely raised the issue whether California property
taxes might be collected upon imported wines stored in their original
cases in the warehouse of a San Francisco importer, the unanimity of
the Supreme Court and the phraseology of its opinion made it
abundantly clear that there was an accepted constitutional orthodoxy
on the tax immunity of imports. 92  Appealing to the authority of Chief
89. Under the Massachusetts licensing act, the county license commissioners were
empowered to refuse to grant any licenses "when in their opinion the public good does
not require them to be granted." and no licenses had been granted for six years in
the county in which Thurlow violated the law by selling intoxicating liquor at retail
without a license. Id. at 509. 510, 512. In Rhode Island. "No licenses shall be
granted for the retailing of wines or strong liquors in any town or city in this State,
when the electors in such town or city, qualified to vote for general officers, shall, at
the annual town or ward meetings held for the election of town or city officers, decide
that no such licenses for retailing as aforesaid shall be granted for that year," and the
town in which Fletcher sold liquor without a license was at the time on a no-license
basis. Id. at 540. As for the New Hampshire statute, which required a license for
the sale of liquor in any quantity and which Pierce violated by selling a barrel of gin
that he had imported from Massachusetts. his counsel conceded in argument that it
did not appear that the state law compelled him to pay anything for his license. Id.
at 561. It is thus clear that the import clause was not actually involved in any one
of the three cases, and that the discussion of the meaning of the term import was intro-
duced only to aid in drawing the line between purely intrastate commerce on the one
hand and foreign or interstate commerce on the other hand.
go. Id. at 549. The next paragraph reads: "This, however, is not true of pro-
hibitory laws, like the law in question. If practically such a law forbids the sale, de-
stroys the vendible character of an imported article, which constitutionally it cannot do,
it does not help the law in relation to such articles, that it also destroys the vendible
character of the like article manufactured in the State, which constitutionally it may
do. It is void pro tanto imports, in any form or shape." Ibid.
91. 13 Wall. 29 (U. S. 1871).
92. "The reasons advanced by the Chief Justice not only commend themselves, by
their intrinsic force, to all minds, but they have received recognition and approval by
this court in repeated instances." Id. at 33. Further proof of the accepted doctrine in
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Justice Marshall and pointing to Chief Justice Taney as a convert to
the original package doctrine,93 Mr. Justice Field's opinion furnished a
pattern which was closely followed by Chief Justice Stone seventy years
later in the most recent import clause case. Mr. Justice Field was in
no way impressed by the attempt of the California Supreme Court to
distinguish Brown v. Maryland from Low v. Austin. "The Supreme
Court of California appears, from its opinion, to have considered the
present case as excepted from the rule laid down in Brown v. The
State of Maryland, because the tax levied is not directly upon imports
as such, and consequently the goods imported are not subjected to any
burden as a class, but only are included as part of the whole property
of its citizens which is subjected equally to an ad valorern tax. But
the obvious answer to this position is found in the fact, which is, in
substance, expressed in the citations made from the opinions of Mar-
shall and Taney, that the goods imported do not lose their character
as imports, and become incorporated into the mass of property of the
State, until they have passed from the control of the importer or been
broken up by him from their original cases. Whilst retaining their
character as imports, a tax upon them, in any shape, is within the con-
stitutional prohibition. The question is not as to the extent of the
tax, or its equality with respect to taxes on other property, but as to
the power of the State to levy any tax." 94 From Low v. Austin,
rather than from Brown v. Maryland, follows the invalidation of Ohio
property taxes on imported fibers stored for use in the factory of a
Xenia cordage manufacturer. It should be noted that these two cases
of Low v. Austin and Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt constitute the
entire line of Supreme Court decisions actually holding imports immune
from general property taxes. 95
The cumulative authority for the immunity of imports from non-
discriminatory property taxation was thus far less compelling in 1945
than the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity had been in 1938.
the post-Civil-War decade can be found in the passage in Woodruff v. Parham, 8
Wall. 123, 137 (U. S. 1868), in which Mr. Justice Miller listed the disastrous conse-
quences that would follow from a determination that goods brought into one state
from another were imports on the same terms as goods from abroad: "The merchant
of Chicago who buys his goods in New York and sells at wholesale in the original
packages, may have his millions employed in trade for half a lifetime and escape all
State, county, and city taxes; for all that he is worth is invested in goods which he
claims to be protected as imports from New York. Neither the State nor the city which
protects his life and property can make him contribute a dollar to support its govern-
ment, improve its thoroughfares or educate its children. The merchant in a town in
Massachusetts, who deals only in wholesale, if he purchase his goods in New York, is
exempt from taxation. If his neighbor purchase in Boston, he must pay all the taxes
which Massachusetts levies with equal justice on the property of all its citizens."
93. Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 32-34 (U. S. 1871).
94. Id. at 34.
95. In May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 (1goo), the contested tax was a gen-
eral property tax, but it was sustained by the Court. See mipra pp. IO-II.
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Yet the Supreme Court departed from precedent in Helvering v. Ger-
hardt " and took a first step in undermining the whole theory of in-
tergovernmental immunity, while in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt
the traditional immunity of imports was extended. The key to the
paradox, at least as far as Chief Justice 'Stone is concerned, seems to
have been the late chief justice's desire to refer questions of tax liability
to Congress. Although the various dissenting and partially concurring
opinions implied that the tax immunity conferred upon the bales of
fibers in the case was irrevocable, 97 Chief Justice Stone, as spokesman
for the majority, unqualifiedly declared: "In view of.the fact that the
Constitution gives Congress authority to consent to state taxation of
imports and hence to lay down its own test for determining when the
immunity ends, we see no convincing practical reason for abandoning
the test which has been applied for more than a century, or why, if we
are to retain it in the case of imports for sale, we should reject it in
the case of imports for manufacture." 98 Also, on the final issue: "The
advantages and disadvantages, if any, which result from the tax im-
munity, are inherent in the import clause. But those advantages and
disadvantages in the case of the Philippines are no more beyond the
reach of Congress than in the case of other imports. Congress is left
free by the terms of the import clause to remove the prohibition of
state taxation of imports and with it the advantages or disadvantages,
whatever they may be, arising from the tax immunity. Congress,
through the commerce clause, possesses the same power of control of
state taxation of all merchandise moving in interstate or foreign com-
merce. And Congress is free, as in the case of other imports, to regu-
late the flow of mechandise from the Philippines into the United States
by the imposition of either customs duties or internal revenue taxes." 19
Mr. Justice Reed, in rejoinder, argued that little can be expected
in the way of congressional relief for an inequitable situation. "Free-
dom from taxation has today become an appreciable advantage. Fur-
thermore this freedom from state taxation is gained through an inter-
pretation of Constitutional p6wer and therefore is beyond the reach of
equalization by the states alone in all circumstances and by the Con-
96. 304 U. S. 405 (1938). See supra pp. 2-3.
97. Mr. Justice Black deplores any discrimination in favor of goods imported by
a manufacturer for his own use. Hooven and Allisoh Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 689,
cited supra notes 43, 56, 58 and 63. Mr. Justice Murphy shares this opinion but op-
poses a construction of the term imports that would place Philippine products at a
disadvantage on the American market as compared with products from foreign coun-
tries. Id. at 692. Mr. Justice Reed, on the other hand, agrees with the Chief Justice
about imports for use, but objects to placing the products of unincorporated territories
or possessions at an advantage over competing products of the continental United
States. Id. at 68o.
98. Id. at 668.
99. Id. at 679.
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gress except by complex tariff legislation which would only reach
warehoused imports from dependencies. The Congressional relief to
producers of the several states of the Union, therefore, is an awkward
approach, which will create irritation with the importing territories by
reason of countervailing tariff increases." 100 It is probably no mere
coincidence that Mr. Justice Reed, who saw little hope from con-
gressional action, quoted the import clause in full, 101 while Chief Justice
Stone resorted to asterisks 102 instead of proceeding to the net produce
clause, which apparently prohibits in express terms any congressional
consent to state collection' of import duties for the benefit of state
treasuries. As remarked by Professor Powell in his recent article on
"State Taxation of Imports": "Doubtless local producers in need of
protection against foreign competitors have had and will continue to
have sufficiently favorable consideration from Congress. This, how-
ever, may not adequately help their local state treasuries which yearn
for property taxes and sales taxes. Congressional consent to the levy
of such taxes would not directly help, since 'the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports shall be
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States.' This is not to say
that Congress could not recompense the states by grants in aid or by
direct assumption of burdens historically borne by the states. This,
however, would be clumsier than full non-discriminatory taxation by
the states, with the power of Congress in the offing to impose any
restrictions or prohibitions that experience might suggest." 103
It seems not unlikely that Chief Justice Stone entirely overlooked
the net produce clause, but this is not the only possible explanation.
It is occasionally maintained that the Constitution empowers Congress
to consent to a state's collection of import taxes for its own use. The
late Dean James Parker Hall went so far as to assert that "Between
179o and 1823 small import duties were frequently permitted by Con-
gress to be levied at particular ports and their proceeds applied by the
ioo. Id. at 68o.
ioi. "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,-lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it's Inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State
on Imports or Exports. shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States;
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress."
(U. S. CO ST., Art. I, J io, Par. 2.) This is quoted, id. at 68i.
102. Id. at 656.
103. Powell, op. cit supra note 56 at 876. In a footnote to this passage is the com-
ment: "The interpretation given above in the text assumes that 'the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts' is not confined to those for the execution of inspection laws, which
do not require the consent of Congress, but includes 'all Duties and Imposts, laid by
any State on Imports or Exports.' If the narrower interpretation should be given,
then Congress would be untrammelled in giving its consent to state taxation of im-
ports and exports." Id. note 64.
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states to various local port and quarantine purposes." 104 It happens,
however, that the acts of Congress cited on this point 105 fall far short
of proving the assertion. In most of the listed statutes, the duties to
which Congress consented were expressly duties of tonnage,' 0 6 as to
which there is no constitutional earmarking for the treasury of the
United States. In the few instar~ces where Congress merely gave consent
to "duties", 107 the present writer is unable to prove that these were
not duties on imports, 08 but conjectures that they also were tonnage
duties.
As for judicial interpretation of the net produce clause, the ques-
tion has never been brought squarely before the Supreme Court. The
clearest utterance is a dictum in Mr. Justice Miller's opinion in the
important case of Woodruff v. Parham, °" in which the Court in 1868,
contrary to intimations in earlier cases, decided that the terms import
and export in the Constitution are restricted to foreign commerce. As
a major link in his chain of reasoning against the interpretation of the
terms so as to include goods shipped in interstate commerce, Mr. Jus-
tice Miller pointed out:
"There are two provisions of the clause under which exemp-
tion from State taxation is claimed in this case, which are not
without influence on that prohibition, namely: that any State
may, with the assent of Congress, lay a tax on impbrts, and that
the net produce of such tax shall be for the benefit of the Treas-
104. HALL, CASES ON CoxsTrrunoNAL LAW (1913) io52, note.
105. "See, e. g., i STAT. 184, 189, 243, 393, 425, 462, 463, 546; 2 STAT. iS, 103, 152,
316, 357, 484, 658, 820; 3 STAT. 125, 683." Ibid.
io6. For example: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of Congress
be and is hereby granted and declared, to the operation of an act of the General As-
sembly of Maryland, passed the twenty-eighth of December, one thousand seven hun-
dred and ninety-three, intituled 'An Act to appoint a health officer, for the port of Balti-
more. in Baltimore County.' so far as to enable the state aforesaid to collect a duty
of one cent per ton, on all vessels coming into the district of Baltimore, from a foreign
voyage, for the purposes in the said act intended." I STAT. 393, § 1 (1794).
107. I STAT. 243 (1792) and I STAT. 463 (1796) both consent to the operation of
an act passed by the General Assembly of Maryland on the first Monday of Novem-
ber, 1791, 6ntitled "An act empowering the wardens of the port of Baltimore to levy
and collect the duty therein mentioned."
I STAT. 546 (1798) consents to the operation of a Massachusetts act passed Feb-
ruary 2, 1798, entitled "An act to incorporate Tobias Lord, Oliver Keating, Thatcher
Goddard and others for the purpose of keeping in repair a pier, at the mouth of the
Kennebunk river, and to grant them a duty for reembursing the expenses of erecting
the same.!
2 STAT. 152 (1802) consents to a Virginia act, entitled "An act to amend and
reduce into one, the several acts of assembly for improving the navigation of Appo-
matox river, from Broadway to Pocahontas bridge."
2 STAT. 658 (I811) consents to the operation of a Georgia act, passed December
12, 1804, "establishing the fees of the harbor master and health officer of the ports of
Savannah and St. Mary's."
io8. The state acts referred to in the preceding note are not to be found in the
volumes of early statutes collected in the Columbia Law Library.
io9. 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868).
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ury of the United States. The framers of the Constitution, claim-
ing for the General Government, as they did, all the duties on
foreign goods imported into the country, might well permit a State
that wished to tax more heavily than Congress did, foreign liquors,
tobacco or other articles injurious to the community, or which
interfered with their domestic policy, to do so, provided such tax
met the approbation of Congress, and was paid into the Federal
treasury. But that it was intended to permit such a tax to be
imposed by such authority on the products of neighboring States
for the use of the Federal government, and that Congress, under
this temptation, was to arbitrate between the State which pro-
posed to levy the tax and those which opposed it, seems altogether
improbable.
"Yet this must be the construction of the clause in question
if it has any reference to goods imported from one State to
another." 110
So far as the writer knows, the only Supreme Court authority that
can be listed contra is De Bary v. Louisiana,1 1 ' which Dean Hall
cited in support of his statement that "The federal Wilson act now
permits the states to levy regulative taxes upon imported liquor in the
unsold original packages." 112 The Supreme Court indubitably held
that the Wilson Act 113 authorized Louisiana to collect license taxes for
the privilege of engaging in the retail liquor business although the only
sales made in the taxable period were of foreign liquor sold in the
original package from the importer's warehouse in New Orleans, but
Chief Justice White's brief memorandum opinion treated the issue as
one of commonplace statutory construction. In the court below,
counsel !or De Bary had urged that the Louisiana licensing act was
only a revenue measure outside the terms of the Wilson Act, and that
the act had "reference only to liquors 'transported' into a 9tate, and
not to liquors 'imported' into a state," 114 but the Louisiana Supreme
Court had decided against him on both points. It had also been con-
tended that "the Wilson Act, if construed to authorize the states to
impose taxes upon imports, becomes obnoxious to Article I, Section
iio. Id. at 133.
111. 227 U. S. io8 (1913).
112. HALL, op. cit. sapra note 104 at 1052, note. Dean Hall cites his authority
as "State v. De Bary & Co., 13o La. logo, 1095 (1912), affirmed in De Bary & Co. v.
Louisiana, 227 U. S. IO8 (1913)."
113. "That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids trans-
ported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or
storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the opera-
tion and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its
police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or
liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt there-
from by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise." 26
STAT. 313 (18go).
114. State v. De Bary, 130 La. 1O9O, 1094 (1912).
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io, of the Constitution of the United States" (quoting the import
clause in its truncated form).115 To this the Louisiana tribunal had
replied: "Suffice it to say, in answer to this, that this constitutional pro-
vision has reference only to such state taxes as may be attempted to
be laid upon imports without the consent of Congress, and has no
reference to state taxes laid with the consent of Congress." 116 If De
Bary's counsel had availed himself of the net produce provision of the
import clause, an interesting constitutional issue would have confronted
the Louisiana court, and would then undoubtedly have figured in the
final argument in Washington. As it was, the import clause received
absolutely no mention in the memorandum opinion delivered by the
United States Supreme Court and one must surmise that it went un-
heeded in the argument before that tribunal. The Supreme Court
emphatically agreed with the court below that the Wilson Act did not
exempt liquors originating in a foreign country from the operation of
the statute,"x  but that is the entire holding of De Bary v. Louisiana.
If the Court should hereafter find that the net produce clause does not
invalidate a congressional act authorizing a state to collect taxes on
imports for its own benefit, the decision would hardly be based upon
the authority of the De Bary case. Rather would the dictum of Chief
Justice Stone in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt be regarded as the
principal I's fingerpost pointing towards a new conclusion.
From the standpoint of policy, there is much to be said in favor of
a congressional statute phrased in some such terms as: "All goods
introduced into any state from any other state, or from any territory
or other possession of the United States, or from any foreign country,
shall, upon arrival in such state, be subject to the revenue laws of such
state to the same extent and in the same manner as though produced
in such state." Such a statute, if only it might be sustained by the
Supreme Court, would sharply curtail many forms of tax avoidance
115. Ibid. The quotation from the import clause stops without including the net
produce provision.
II6. Ibid.
117. "The word 'all' [in the Wilson Act] causes a consideration of the point of
origin of the liquors transported to be wholly negligible, and this irresistible conclu-
sion as to the meaning of the text is rendered if possible clearer by a consideration of
the intent of Congress in enacting the Wilson law. In reason it is certain that the
purpose which led to the enactment of the law was to give the several States power to
deal with all liquors coming from outside their limits upon arrival and before sale,
thus rendering the state police authority more complete and efficacious on the subject;
a purpose which would be plainly set at naught by exempting liquors brought into a
State from a foreign country from the operation of the statute." De Bary v. Louisiana,
227 U. S. io8, 11o-i1 (1913), cited supra note iii.
118. So far as the writer knows, the only other such pointer is to be found in
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218 (1933), cited
supra notes 44 and 45, in which, at 226, Mr. Justice Butler remarked: "Alabama was
powerless, without the consent of Congress, to tax the nitrate before such sales or to
require appellant by the payment of occupation or franchise tax or otherwise to pur-
chase from it the privilege of selling goods so imported and handled. [Italics added.]"
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and would ease the Court's burden by simplifying several branches of
the law of taxation. It is the writer's belief that the language of the
Court's opinion in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt-perhaps also the
actual determination of the issue-hinged upon the late chief justice's
conscious or unconscious wish for such an outcome. (It will be remem-
bered that in 189o frequent allusions to the consent of Congress, 19
made by Chief Justice Fuller in an opinion condemning certain mani-
festations of a state prohibition law enacted without such consent, led to
the enactment of the Wilson Act 120 by Congress and its subsequent
validation by the Supreme Court.12 1)
Venturing further in psychoanalysis, the writer detects as to im-
ported fibers not only judicial willingness to sanction congressional
consent to state taxation but also judicial reluctance to deny tax im-
munity in such terms as to prevent Congress from subsequently con-
ferring exemption. It is simple enough for Congress to amend a
federal tax law so as to confer an immunity not previously recognized
by the Court, but its power to terminate an approved liability to state-
taxation is likely to be tenuous. It has been noted that the initial in-
validation of state inspection fees imposed in the silence of Congress
on federally distributed fertilizer gives rise to a subsequent power of
Congress to determine the issue either way.122  Similarly, a sufficient
motive for the invalidation of general property taxes in Hooven and
Allison Co. v. Evatt may be found in a more or less conscious reali-
zation that it would be next to impossible to find a basis for con-
gressional exemption of imported fibers awaiting manufacture from a
judically recognized liability to non-discriminatory general property
taxes. If the Supreme Court wants Congress to decide whether or not
alleged "imports" shall be subject to state taxation, its recent opinion,
despite the straining of the precedents and the utter disregard of the
net produce provision, probably selects the lesser horn of the dilemma.
To summarize briefly, the writer believes that Hooven and Alli-
son Co. v. Evatt is to be understood by comparison with recent in-
tergovernmental tax opinions rather than in the setting of the import
clause precedents. These latter are by no means determinative of the
119. In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. IO (189o). Inter ali: "Hence, inasmuch as
interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of
commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so
long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do,
it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled. [Italics
added.]" Id. at iop, 1io. Also: "Up to that point of time, we hold that in the absence
of congressional permission to do so, the State had no power to interfere by seizure,
or any other action, in prohibition of importation and sale by the foreign or non-
resident importer. [Italics added.]" Id. at 124, 125.
120. See note 113 stpra.
121. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (I891).
122. Supra pp. 5-6.
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issue presented. The only previous holding of the Court against the
liability of imports to general ,property taxation-in Low v. Austin
-had beei accompanied by a weak opinion that relied upon a misap-
prehension of Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the License Cases,
and even Low v. Austin had conferred no tax immunity upon imports
held for use in manufacture. On the other hand, Hooven and Allison
Co. v. Evatt fits closely into the pattern of the intergovernmental tax
cases in which a judicial finding for or against liability depends pri-
marily upon the presumed intention of Congress and is declared to be
subject to modification by express congressional determination. The
1945 import clause decision furnishes an outstanding example of the
leave-it-to-Congress technique that should go down in history as one
of the important contributions of the late Chief Justice Stone to the
constitutional law of taxation and tax immunities.
